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2Prices vs. Quantities with Incomplete Enforcement
1. Introduction
In a seminal paper, Weitzman (1974) explored the question of whether it is better to
implement control over an economic variable using a price instrument (e.g., taxes) or a quantity
instrument (e.g., tradeable quotas). He demonstrated that uncertainty concerning the marginal cost
of control affects the choice between these two regulatory instruments. When the planner’s
objective is to maximize the expected net benefits of controlling that economic variable, a quantity
instrument ought to be preferred if the marginal benefit curve is steeper than the marginal cost
curve, otherwise, a price instrument ought to be preferred. The basic reasoning is that as the
marginal benefit curve becomes relatively steeper than the marginal cost curve, having certainty on
the amount of control becomes more important than having certainty on the cost of control.1
Weitzman’s motivating example, that of instrument choice for pollution control, continues
to be of great concern in today’s environmental policy-making (Fisher et al., 1996). In this context,
we find a growing literature that has extended Weitzman’s basic framework to compare Pigouvian
taxes and systems of tradable quotas in different directions (e.g., Roberts and Spence, 1976;
Baldursson and von der Fehr, 1998; Hoel and Karp, 1998).2 No work, however, has extended
Weitzman’s framework to the case in which the environmental agency (or any other agency) has
limited monitoring and enforcement capabilities to ensure full compliance with the regulation.
Imperfect monitoring and incomplete enforcement have proved to be central in
understanding environmental policy in practice (Russell, 1990), 3 and consequently, it is important
to ask whether they have any policy implications in the choice of regulatory instruments. Early
theoretical works used simple enforcement policies to study the implications of incomplete
enforcement on instrument performance and design for the case of taxes and pollution standards
(Harford, 1978; Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 1979) and tradeable quotas (Malik, 1990).
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 For a complete discussion on Weitzman’s results see Baumol and Oates (1988).
2
 Extensions in more general contexts are in Yohe (1978) and Finkelshtain and Kislev (1997).
3
 Particularly in less developed countries where compliance rates are substantially lower than in industrialized countries.
3Empirical observation of compliance higher than anything predicted by these simple models
motivated the development of richer models for the case of pollution-standards regulation.
Harrington (1988) modeled incomplete enforcement as a dynamic repeated game between the
agency and the firm. Firms that are detected to be in violation today are subject to more frequent
inspections and higher fines tomorrow. In a recent paper, Livernois and McKenna (1999) offered a
different explanation by adding self-reporting requirements and enforcement power to their model.
Firms were required to monitor their own pollution and report their compliance status to the
environmental agency, which had the enforcement power to bring into compliance any firm
eventually found to be submitting a false report. Both models produce compliance in cases in which
the expected penalty for noncompliance is insufficient to prevent violations in the earlier models.
Unfortunately, no such models have been developed for the case of taxes and tradeable quotas.
In this paper I extend Weitzman’s work to allow for incomplete enforcement. I frame the
discussion within the context of environmental policy, but there is nothing specific in the model to
indicate that the results do not apply to other contexts. I retain Weitzman’s one-period framework
and additive uncertainty, and model incomplete enforcement incorporating the concepts of self-
reporting and enforcement power from Livernois and McKenna (1999). Since the focus is on
instrument choice, I abstract from considerations concerning optimal enforcement policy and
assume an exogenous enforcement structure, which can be considered optimal.4
Results indicate that a first-best design that neglects incomplete enforcement is always
inefficient. A second-best design that incorporates incomplete enforcement, and where cost and
benefit curves are known with certainty, can be implemented equally well with either instrument. If
benefit and cost curves are uncertain, however, a quantity instrument performs better than a price
instrument.
The rationale for the latter result is that with incomplete enforcement the effective (or
observed) amount of control under a quantity instrument is not longer fixed. Instead, it adapts to the
possible shocks affecting the marginal cost curve. Indeed, if the marginal costs curve turns out to be
higher than expected, some firms would choose not to comply with the regulation, and
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 It shall become clear that there is no reason to believe that enforcement policies should differ among instruments.
4consequently, the effective amount and cost of control would be lower. Because a quantity
instrument would now have this “flexibility” for the cost of control to adapt to unexpected shocks,
the advantage of prices over quantities is necessarily reduced. Put differently, the marginal cost
curve becomes relatively flatter under incomplete enforcement. A more intuitive explanation would
be that under incomplete enforcement the regulator wants to pay closer attention to the amount of
control (i.e., emissions reduction) than to the cost of control ceteris paribus; a task in which a
quantity instrument is more effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and explains
compliance under prices (taxes) and quantities (tradeable quotas). Section 3 starts with the planning
problem of a regulator maximizing social welfare (expected net benefits), and then illustrates the
effect of incomplete enforcement on welfare for both taxes and tradeable quotas. Section 4 explores
the second-best design under incomplete enforcement for two cases. First, for the case where
marginal cost and marginal benefit curves are known with certainty, and then, for the case where
these curves are subject to uncertainty. Section 5 answers the central question of instrument choice
under benefit and cost uncertainty and incomplete enforcement. Section 6 explores the same
question for an alternative enforcement policy. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 7.
2. The model
Consider the following one-period model. There is a continuum of polluting firms of mass 1
subject to an environmental regulation that can take the form of either taxes (price instrument) or
tradeable quotas (quantity instrument). In the absence of regulation, each firm emits one unit of a
uniform pollutant, which can be abated at a constant marginal cost c. Firms differ according to their
control cost, c. The distribution function of c, g(c), defined over the interval [ , ]c c , is continuous
and commonly known by firms and the welfare-maximizing regulator, and G(c) is the cumulative
distribution function. The regulator does not know the control cost of any particular firm, but can
derive the aggregate abatement cost curve for the industry, C(q), where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 is the aggregate
5quantity of emissions reduction.5 The regulator also knows the social benefit curve from emissions
reduction, B(q). As usual, we assume that B’(q) > 0, B’’(q) ≤ 0, C’(q) > 0, C’’(q) ≥ 0, B’(0) > C’(0),
and B’(q) < C’(q) for q sufficiently large.
An enforcement agency is responsible for enforcing compliance for individual firms under
either regulatory regime. Firms are required to monitor their own emissions and submit a
compliance status report to the enforcement agency (that for simplicity is the regulator).6 Emissions
are not easily observed by the regulator except during costly inspection visits, when they can be
measured accurately. Thus, some firms may have incentive to report themselves as being under
compliance when, in reality, they are not. The compliance report also includes either tax payments
or details of quota transfers, which are assumed to be tracked at no cost by the regulator. As an
example, someone submitting a report with one unit of pollution and no tax payment can be
relatively easy identified. Similarly, a firm A submitting a report with one unit of pollution and a
“false” quota transfer from firm B can be easily identified, since B would not be reporting a transfer
for which does not get paid. To corroborate the truthfulness of reports received, however, the
regulator must observed emissions, which is costly.
Since the regulator lacks sufficient resources to induce full compliance, in order to verify the
truthfulness of reports, s/he randomly selects a fraction φ of firms reporting compliance to have
their emissions and control devices inspected. Firms whose reports are found to be in violation are
levied a fine F and brought immediately under the required compliance, indicated by their own
reports.7,8 Firms reporting noncompliance face the same treatment, so it is always in a firm’s best
economic interests to report compliance, even if that is not the case.9 Thus, each firm faces a
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 The aggregate cost curve is given by C q c G
c
y
( ) = ∫ d , where y G q= −1 ( ) . Note that C’(q) = y, C’(0) = c , and C’’(q) =
1/g(y).
6
 Self-reporting is an increasingly common feature of enforcement, not only in the U.S., but also in some LDCs.
7
 An effective enforcement policy should not only fine the violator, but also brings the violator under compliance
(Russell, 1990).
8
 In Section 6, we relax this assumption and consider an enforcement policy that permits violators to freely choose a
strategy (even one that differs from the strategy set out in their compliance report,) to come under compliance.
9
 Noncompliance and truth-telling could be a feasible strategy under other circumstances (see Livernois and McKenna,
1999).
6probability φ of being inspected.10 We now describe optimal compliance for each regulatory regime
(i.e., taxes and tradable quotas) when enforcement is incomplete.11
2.1 Compliance with taxes (prices)
Given a Pigouvian tax τ, inspection probability φ, fine F, and marginal abatement cost c,
each firm seeks to minimize its expected total compliance costs. Let us first consider the case where
c < τ. Such a firm will never consider paying the tax as part of its compliance strategy. It will
choose to reduce one unit of emissions at cost c and submit a truthful compliance report if
0)1()( φφ −++< cFc (1)
where F + c would be the cost incurred if the firm is found submitting a false report. Eq. (1) gives
the following “cut-off point” for a truthful compliance report when c < τ
~c F=
−
φ
φ1 .  (2)
If  c c c≤ < ~ , the firm reduces pollution and submits a truthfully compliance report. Conversely, if
~c c< < τ , the non-compliant firm does not reduce pollution and submits a false report indicating
that it is reducing pollution.
Let us now consider the case where c ≥ τ. In this case, a firm will never consider reducing
emissions at cost c as part of its compliance strategy. It will choose to pay taxes for one unit of
pollution and submit a truthful compliance report as long as
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 Our one-period model assumes that the regulator does not alter its policy of random inspections in response to
information acquired about firms’ types.
11
 A two-period model of incomplete enforcement that would explicitly differentiate between "before" and "after"
inspections would not alter any of our results.
7τ φ φ< + + −( ) ( )F c 1 0 (3)
Note that if the firm is caught with a false report, it must not only pay the fine F but also reduce a
one unit of pollution to be in compliance as indicated in its report.12 The cut-off point for a
truthfully compliance report when c ≥ τ is then
$c F= −
τ
φ . (4)
Thus, if c c c≥ > $ , the firm does not reduce pollution, but rather pays taxes and submits a truthful
compliance report. Conversely, if τ ≤ <c c$ , the firm does not reduce pollution, does not pay taxes
and submits a false compliance report.
Compliant firms are those with either low or high costs. Low-cost firms find it cheaper to
reduce one unit of pollution than to face the expected penalty and control costs. High-cost firms, on
the other hand, find it cheaper to pay the tax than the expected penalty and control costs. Notice also
that if c is uniformly distributed the fraction of noncompliant firms “before inspection” is
( $ ~) / ( )c c c c− − , and “after inspection,” this fraction drops to )/()~ˆ)(1( cccc −−−φ .
A simple comparative static can be done with the aid of Figure 1. Individual control costs
and the probability of being inspected are on the vertical and horizontal axes, respectively. For a
given τ and F, it is drawn ~ ~( )c c= φ  and $ $( )c c= φ . As φ increases, the “before-inspection” fraction
of noncompliant firms, ( $ ~) / ( )c c c c− − , reduces. At a point such as φf < 1 there would be full
compliance and no need for inspection.(Note that at φ = φf, τ = =~ $c c ). Because enforcement is
costly, however, the actual inspection probability φa is lower than φf, which inevitably leads to a
fraction )/()~ˆ)(1( cccc aaa −−−φ  of “after-inspection” noncompliant firms. The fine F also affect
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 The alternative enforcement policy explored in Section 6 let the firm to comply by either reducing one unit of
pollution or paying the tax.
8compliance. If F increases ~( )c φ shifts upward, $( )c φ  shifts downward and the non-compliance area
shrinks.
Finally, because of enforcement power, the total reduction after inspection and (effective)
enforcement is given by
q G c G c G ce = + −(~) [ ( $) (~)]φ (5)
which represents reductions from low-cost compliant firms and a fraction φ of non-compliant firms
that return to compliance by reducing one unit of pollution. The second term of Eq. (5) shows that
enforcement power yields much higher compliance rates than what can simply be attributed to F; in
the spirit of Livernois and McKenna (1999).13 In addition, control cost after inspection and
enforcement is given by
∫∫ += c
c
c
c
ee GcGcqC
ˆ
~
~
dd)( φ (6)
Because some relatively high cost non-compliant firms found in violation must reduce pollution,
Ce(qe) is not cost-effective. In other words, qe is not achieved at the lowest possible cost. As
compliance increases, however, Ce(qe) approaches C(q), and when φ =φf (i.e., full compliance),
Ce(qe) ≡ C(q).
2.2 Compliance with tradable quotas (quantities)
Compliance with tradeable quotas is similar to compliance with taxes, but for a market
clearing condition. As we shall show, it makes no difference whether the regulator distributes the
tradeable quotas for free or auctions them off. Without loss of generality, consider the regulator
distributes gratis a total amount of x pollution quotas, so each firm receives x. Assume for the
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 If only F is used, the total reduction would be )( FG φ
9moment that the market equilibrium price of quotas is p. Let us first consider the case where c < p.
In this case, a firm would never consider buying quotas as part of its compliance strategy. It would
instead choose to reduce one unit of emissions at cost c, sell x quotas at price p > 0, and submit a
truthful compliance report as long as
c xp F c xp xp− < + − + − −φ φ( ) ( )( )1 (7)
Therefore, the cut-off point for a truthful compliance report when c < p is, as before
~c F=
−
φ
φ1 . (8)
If c c c≤ < ~ , the firm reduces pollution, sells its quotas at a market price p, and submits a truthful
compliance report. Conversely, if ~c c p< < , the firm does not reduce pollution, sells all its quotas,
and submits a false report indicating that it is reducing all pollution. Note that the latter is an
optimal non-compliance strategy.14
Let us now consider the case where c ≥ p. In this case, a firm would never consider reducing
emissions at cost c as part of its compliance strategy. It would choose to buy 1−x quotas, and submit
a truthfully compliance report as long as
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1− < + − + − −x p F c xp xpφ φ (9)
Therefore, the cut-off point for a truthful compliance report when c ≥ p is
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 The alternative non-compliance strategy would be to keep a positive amount y (greater or lower than x) of quotas, not
reduce pollution, and submit a false report for the difference 1−y of non-compliance. It is not difficult to show that
the lowest expected cost is for y = 0, which is the previous non-compliance strategy.
10
$c
p
F= −φ .                                                                                                                           (10)
If  c c c≥ > $ , the firm does not reduce pollution, but buys quotas and submits a truthful compliance
report. Conversely, if p c c≤ < $ , the firm does not reduce pollution, sells its quotas, and submits a
false report. Again, the latter is an optimal non-compliance strategy.
The fraction of “before-inspection” non-compliance, (~ $) / ( )c c c c− − , as a function of φ
could also be illustrated in Figure 1 by simply substituting p for τ. This suggests an apparent
“compliance equivalence” between taxes and tradeable quotas. However, p is endogenously
determined, so compliance would be the same as long as the allocation x yields an equilibrium price
p = τ.
To find the market equilibrium price of quotas p (or alternatively, the auction clearing
price), we impose the market clearing condition that sales equal purchases15
x G x G
c
c
c
c
d d
$
$
( )∫ ∫= −1 (11)
Expression (11) indicates both that noncompliant firms sell all their quotas in the market and that no
firm found in violation goes back to the market to buy quotas. The latter is because the optimal
strategy for a noncompliant firm is to sell all its quotas and eventually reduce pollution if found in
violation.16
Replacing (10) into (11), we obtain
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 If x quotas are to be auctioned off, the market clearing condition would be x G= ∫ dcc$ , which is eq. (9) rearranged.
This and the fact that eqs. (5) and (7) are independent of the individual allocation of quotas demonstrate that in this
particular context, it is irrelevant whether quotas are distributed gratis or auctioned off.
16
 The alternative enforcement policy explored in Section 6 let the firm to comply by either reducing one unit of
pollution or buying quotas.
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p G x F= − +−φ φ1 1( ) (12)
where G x− −1 1( )  is the marginal cost c just after (1−x) units of pollution have been reduced, or
alternatively, the price that we would observe under full compliance pf (e.g. if φ ≥ φf). Note that for
a uniform distribution of g(c), G x c x c c− − = − −1 1( ) ( )  and p c x c c F= − − +φ[ ( ) ] .17
It is not immediately apparent from eq. (12) whether the equilibrium price would be higher
or lower than the price under full compliance pf, but it is not difficult to demonstrate that
Lemma 1. The equilibrium price with incomplete enforcement (p) is always lower than the price
under full compliance (pf).
Proof. Replacing G x− −1 1( )  for pf in eq. (12), using (10) and the fact that p c< $  by construction,
yields p < pf. Alternatively, observe that p < pf  for F= 0 and that p grows linearly with F until full
compliance, where p = pf.
The reason for p < pf is that noncompliance and quotas are close substitutes, which depresses the net
demand for quotas and therefore its price.18
Finally, emissions reduction after enforcement, qe, and control cost after enforcement,
Ce(qe), are given by expressions analogous to eqs. (5) and (6) above. Because there is additional
reduction after firms have been found in violation, it is not so immediately clear whether qe is lower
or higher than 1−x, which is the amount that was originally intended to be abated through tradeable
quotas. We establish
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 I introduce the uniform distribution here for later use. A uniform distribution implies that )()( ccqC −=′′  over the
interval [ , ]c c .
18
 Using a different enforcement policy, Malik (1990) found the same result when the inspection probability was the
same across firms.
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Lemma 2. The total “after-enforcement” reduction (qe) is always lower than the amount required
by the original distribution of quotas (1−x).
Proof. From eqs. (12) and (10), we find that $ ( )c G x= −−1 1 . This, together with eqs. (5) and (8),
gives qe =(1−φ)G[φF/(1−φ)]+φ(1−x). On the other hand, using eq. (12) and the fact that
p p G xf< = −
−1 1( )  yields G(φF/(1−φ)) < (1−x). Combining both results finishes the proof that qe
< (1−x).
3. The planning problem
Let us start with the regulator’s original planning problem that is to choose the amount of
control q that maximizes the social welfare function
W q B q C q( ) ( ) ( )= − (13)
In a world of certainty and complete enforcement, the solution q* must satisfy the first order
condition
B’(q*) = C’(q*) (14)
To implement the first-best outcome q*, it makes no difference whether the regulator uses the
optimal tax τ* = B’(q*) = C’(q*) and has individual firms to reduce emissions accordingly, or
whether s/he allocates x* tradeable pollution quotas that produce a total reduction of q* = 1−x*
(Weitzman, 1974; Baumol and Oates, 1988). The equilibrium price of quotas would be p* = τ*;
therefore, the regulator would show no preference for either prices (taxes) or quantities (tradeable
permits). Eq. (14) can also be written as G x B x− − = ′ −1 1 1( *) ( *) = τ*, where the pair (τ*, x*) is the
first-best design that yields the first-best outcome if and only if full compliance can be enforced.
13
If, for some reason, the regulator does not acknowledge that enforcement is incomplete (i.e.,
a fraction of firms is noncompliant) and implements the first-best design either through taxes (τ*) or
tradeable quotas (x*), instrument choice may have some welfare consequences.19 We explore this
matter by estimating the difference in social welfare ∆pq between prices (taxes) and quantities
(tradeable quotas). Using Ce(qe) instead of the “least-cost” cost curve, C(q), we have
∆ pq ≡ − = − − −W W x B q C q B q x C q xe e e e e e( *) ( *) ( ( *)) ( ( *)) [ ( ( *)) ( ( *))]τ τ τ (15)
where qe(τ*), Ce( qe(τ*)), qe(x*) and Ce( qe(x*)) can be obtained from eqs. (5) and (6). In addition,
these expressions require values of $( *)c τ  and $( *)c x . From eq. (4), we know that
$( *) * /c Fτ τ φ= − , and from (12) we know that p G x F F= − + = +−φ φ φτ φ1 1( *) * , which, when
substituted into (10), yields $( *) *c x = τ . Comparing $( *)c τ  and $( *)c x , we can establish that
Lemma 3. $( *) $( *)c c xτ > , and therefore, qe(τ*) > qe(x*), B(qe(τ*)) > B(qe(x*)) and Ce(qe(τ*)) >
Ce(qe(x*)).
Proof. By construction we have that τ φ φ*
~> =
−
c F
1
, and therefore, $( *) $( *)c c xτ > . If this
inequality holds, it is immediate from eqs. (5) and (6) that the rest of the lemma holds.
Lemma 3 indicates a welfare trade-off between prices and quantities when the regulator
implements a first-best policy design in the presence of incomplete enforcement. Because p(x*) <
p* = τ*, the number of non-compliant firms is higher under taxes, which  implies higher after-
enforcement reductions (qe) and benefits (B), but also higher costs (Ce). To see under what
circumstances the welfare trade-off favors prices (taxes), we develop expression (15) using linear
approximations for the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves such as in Weitzman (1974) and
Baumol and Oates (1988). For the benefit curve, let
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 We leave the discussion of second-best design for the next section.
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2
2
)( qBqbqB ⋅′′+⋅=    (16)
where 0)0( >′≡ Bb  and B′′ < 0 are fixed coefficients. We use this notation to be consistent with the
cost curve, for which we simply assume that g(c) follows a uniform distribution, so the slope of the
marginal cost curve can be written as ′′ = −C c c . The first-best design would be
BC
BcCb
′′
−
′′
′′
−
′′
=*τ (17)
and
BC
cbqx
′′
−
′′
−
−=−= 1*1* (18)
With these simplifying assumptions and some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the following
expression
][)(2
]*)1[(
2
2
pq BCC
F
′′+′′
′′
−−
−=∆ φφ
φτφ (19)
and state
Lemma 4. If the regulator implements the first-best design under incomplete enforcement, the
choice between prices (τ*) vs. quantities (x*) is not welfare neutral. In this particular enforcement
policy, quantities provide higher social welfare as long as BC ′′>′′ φ .
Note that under full compliance, τ* ~= c = $c  (see Figure 1) and ∆pq = 0, so instrument choice
has no welfare consequences. Lemma 4 indicates, however, that if the absolute value of the slopes
15
of the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves are the same, BC ′′=′′ , and the regulator
implements the first-best in the presence of incomplete enforcement, a quantity instrument always
provides higher social welfare given that expression (19) is negative. These welfare differences
arise because under incomplete enforcement both first-best designs (τ* and x*) are not longer
optimal. Other things equal (i.e., BC ′′=′′ ), the quantity x* results to be closer to the second-best
optimal design than the price τ*.
Lemma 4 has important policy implications. In many situations the task of choosing policy
goals and instruments is independent from the task of policy implementation. If that is so, Lemma 4
suggests that choosing instruments under the assumption of complete enforcement may lead to the
wrong choice of policy instrument.
4. Optimal design with incomplete enforcement
In the presence of incomplete enforcement, the first-best design is no longer optimal. A
second-best design provides higher welfare. We first consider the case in which benefit and cost
curves are known with certainty, and then turn to the uncertainty case.
4.1 Cost and benefit certainty
Let us first find the second-best tax τ**. The regulator maximizes social welfare
W B q C qe e e( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))τ τ τ= − (20)
where Ce(qe) is given by eq. (6), and ~c and $c are given by eqs. (2) and (4), respectively. Assuming
the same linear approximations for B(q) and g(c), the first-order condition can be written as
01)()()( =
′′




−−
′′+
C
F
q
qB
qb eee φ
τ
∂τ
τ∂
τ∂τ
τ∂ (21)
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where q c Ce ( ) ( ) /τ τ= − ′′  and ∂ τ ∂τq Ce ( ) / /= ′′1 . Thus, the solution to (21) is
BC
CFBcCb
′′−′′
′′+′′−′′
= φ
φ
τ
)(
** (22)
Note that under full compliance (for example, when φ =1 and F = 0), expression (22) becomes (17).
In addition, we establish that
Lemma 5. τ** < τ*.
Proof. For linear approximations, the proof is straightforward. Develop τ* and τ** according to
(17) and (22), and use, by construction, φ φ τ1− = <F c
~ * .
20
When enforcement is incomplete, Lemma 6 indicates that for this particular enforcement structure
the regulator is better off setting a less stringent policy.21
Let us now find the second-best quota allocation x**. This can be found indirectly by
estimating p**, the equilibrium price that would prevail if x** is implemented. If we replace τ by p
in (20) and let the regulator choose p that maximizes social welfare, we obtain
**
)(
** τφ
φ
=
′′−′′
′′+′′−′′
=
BC
CFBcCbp (23)
and, using eq. (12)
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 Note that as φ decreases, τ** approaches zero; and since ∂τ**/∂φ > 0 (from eq. (12)), the proof is also immediate.
21
 See Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979) for a similar result.
17
CBC
CcbBFcFpGx
′′′′
−
′′
′′
−−
′′
−−
+=



−−= )(
)(])1[(1**1** φ
φφ
φ (24)
Note that under full compliance (for example, when φ =1 and F = 0), expression (24) becomes (18).
Before discussing eq. (23), we establish
Lemma 6. x** > x*.
Proof. Since p** = τ**, from eq. (23), and p* = τ*; employing Lemma 5, we find that p* > p**.
Using eq. (12) and the fact that G(⋅) is an increasing function completes the proof.
Lemmas 5 and 6 and eq. (23) can be summarized in the following two propositions
Proposition 1. A first-best design through either prices (τ*) or quantities (x*) is always inefficient
(i.e., there is a design that yields higher welfare) in the presence of incomplete enforcement.
Proposition 2. When cost and benefit curves are known with certainty, it is irrelevant whether the
regulator uses prices (τ**) or quantities (x**) to achieve the second-best outcome. Both
instruments provide the same social welfare.
Proposition 1 (its proof is immediate from Lemmas 5 and 6) has very important policy
implications. If the task of choosing policy goals is done independently from policy implementation
considerations, policy goals would be wrong. For this particular enforcement policy they would be
too stringent.
Proposition 2 does not require a formal proof either. It suffices to realize that x** yields p**
and that the compliance strategies are identical if  p = τ. Proposition 2 argues, as in the case of
complete enforcement (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988), that when cost and benefit curves are known
with certainty, incomplete enforcement does not affect instrument choice as long as the regulator
implements the second-best design. In short, in a second-best context, quantities and prices are fully
equivalent.
18
4.2 Cost and benefit uncertainty
It is well known that regulators’ task of choosing policy goals and instruments must be
carried out in the presence of significant uncertainty concerning C(q) and B(q). Following
Weitzman (1974) and Baumol and Oates (1988), we model uncertainty as an additive stochastic
error term. For the benefit curve, let ∂B(q,θ)/∂q = B’(q) + θ, where θ is a random shock such that
E[θ] = 0 and E[θ2] = σθ2 . For the cost curve, let c(η) = c + η, where η is another random shock such
that E[η] = 0 and E[η2] =ση2 . All individual costs face the same shock, which produces the desired
“parallel” shift of the aggregate marginal cost curve, C′(q), in the amount η. In other words, we
have that ∂C(q,η)/∂q = C’(q) + η.
The regulator’s planning problem now is to choose τ (or x) that maximizes expected social
welfare. In the case of taxes, the regulator maximizes
[ ]E W E B q C qe e e[ ( , , )] ( ( , ), ) ( ( , ))τ θ η τ η θ τ η= − (25)
where22
q g c c g c ce
c
c
c
c
( , ) ( ) ( )
~
~
$
τ η η φ η
η
= − + −
+
∫ ∫d d (26)
C q cg c c cg c ce e
c
c
c
c
( , ) ( ) ( )
~
~
$
η η φ η
η
= − + −
+
∫ ∫d d (27)
                                                
22
 We replace dG by gdc and g(c) by g(c-η), so we still have that G c( )+ − =η η 0  and G c( )+ − =η η 1 .
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and ~c and $c  are given by eqs. (2) and (4). Substituting eqs. (26) and (27) into (25), and taking
derivative with respect to τ, we obtain the first-order condition
E b
q q
B q
q
F
C
e e
e
e∂ τ η
∂τ θ
∂ τ η
∂τ τ η
∂ τ η
∂τ
τ
φ
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )+ + ′′ − −

 ′′



 =
1
0 (28)
where q c Ce ( , ) ( ) /τ η τ η= − − ′′  and ∂ τ η ∂τq Ce ( , ) / /= ′′1 . Taking expectation, we find the
solution to eq. (25) to be τ**; the second-best tax under certainty.
Similarly, in the case of tradeable quotas, the regulator chooses x that maximizes
[ ]E W x E B q x C q xe e e[ ( , , )] ( ( , ), ) ( ( , ))θ η η θ η= − (29)
Note that this formulation is slightly different from the certainty case, where we first obtain the
optimal price of quotas, p**, and  then the optimal allocation, x**. Here it is not immediate if we
can proceed as before, because p is a random variable. In fact, using the market clearing condition
(11), we have
1− = = − −



+∫x G G
p
F
c
c
d φ ηη
$
(30)
and therefore,
p x G x F p( , ) ( )η φ φ φη φη= − + + = +−1 1 (31)
Eq. (31) shows that price fluctuations are lower under incomplete enforcement than under full
enforcement, where the equilibrium price would be p + η .
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The formal solution to eq. (29) is left to the reader. We instead present an indirect method
that yields the same result because of the linear approximation we are using. Consider p as the
decision variable and, as before, replace it by τ in eq. (25). Not surprisingly, the solution is p = τ**
= p**. Since the random variable η enters linearly in (31), the allocation x that solves E[p] ≡ p =
p** must be x**. Therefore, the allocation of quotas x** remains second-best optimal under
uncertainty.
To summarize:
Proposition 3. Cost and benefit uncertainty does not alter the second-best design neither for either
prices (τ**) or quantities (x**) when marginal benefit and cost curves are assumed linear.
Baumol and Oates (1998) obtained exactly the same result for Weitzman’s (1974) problem, that
uncertainty does not affect the second-best design when the marginal benefit and cost curves are
assumed linear.
5. Instrument choice under uncertainty and incomplete enforcement
We now turn to the central question of this paper as to whether there should be any
preference for prices over quantities (or vice versa) when cost and benefit curves are uncertain and
enforcement is incomplete. We explore this question by estimating the difference in expected social
welfare
∆ pq ≡ −E W W x[ ( **, , ) ( **, , )]τ θ η θ η (32)
Either design (τ** or x**) is ex-ante second-best optimum, but because of uncertainty neither one
will be ex post second-best optimum. The relevant question here then becomes: which instrument
comes closer to the ex-post second-best optimum? The normative implication of (32) is that if ∆pq >
0, prices provide higher expected welfare than do quantities, and accordingly, ought to be preferred
as policy instrument. If ∆pq < 0, quantities ought to be preferred.
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The development of (32) simplifies greatly if we use  p = τ** + φη, as indicated by eq. (31),
that together with linear approximations for marginal curves, leads to the following
q
c
Ce
( **, ) **τ η τ η= − −
′′
 (33a)
q x
c
Ce
( **, ) **η τ φη η= + − −
′′
(33b)
$( **, ) **c Fτ η τ φ= − (33c)
$( **, ) ** **c x F Fη τ φηφ
τ
φ η=
+
− = − + (33d)
Substituting these expressions into (32), ∆pq becomes
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(34)
Taking expectation, and assuming that E[θη] = 0, the right-hand side reduces to
])1([)(2 2
2
pq BBCC
′′
−+′′+′′
′′
=∆ φφση (35)
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Eq. (35) is the main result of this paper. Its implications can be better understood by recalling
Weitzman’s (1974) result, which can be seen by simply plugging φ  = 1 into eq. (35). Weitzman’s
result would suggest using prices as long as the marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal
benefit curve, that is to say, as long as C′′ > B′′. With incomplete enforcement, however, the
advantage of prices over quotas reduces substantially given that 1−φ  > 0. In fact, eq. (35)
recommends to use prices if and only if C′′ > (2−φ )B′′. Furthermore, if C′′ = B′′ quantities
ought to be preferred as the policy instrument. We summarize the main result of the paper in the
following proposition
Proposition 4. Cost and benefit uncertainty does affect instrument choice. Under incomplete
enforcement, the advantage of prices (τ**) over quantities (x**) is reduced substantially. Prices
ought to be preferred if and only if C′′ > (2−φ )B′′. Furthermore, if C′′ = B′′, a quantity
instrument should be the preferable policy choice.
To get the intuition behind Proposition 4, it is useful to recall Weitzman’s (1974) basic
reasoning of using prices over quantities as long as missing the ex-post optimum amount of control
has lower welfare consequences than missing the ex-post optimum (marginal) cost of control, which
happens when the marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal benefit curve. In a quantity
regime with full compliance the amount of control remains always fixed while the cost of control is
the subject to large swings because of uncertainty. If the marginal cost curve is really steep, the
(marginal) cost of control can be very well off the ex-post optimum, and that is when, a price
instrument that fixes the marginal cost of control may be more appropriate in that situation.
With incomplete enforcement, however, the effective (or observed) amount of control under
a quantity instrument is not longer fixed. Instead, it adapts to the possible shocks affecting the
marginal cost curve. Indeed, if the marginal costs curve turns out to be higher than expected, some
firms would choose not to comply with the regulation, and consequently, the effective amount and
cost of control would be lower. Because a quantity instrument would now have this “flexibility” for
the cost of control to adapt to unexpected shocks, the advantage of prices over quantities is
necessarily reduced. Put differently, the marginal cost curve becomes relatively flatter under
incomplete enforcement. A more intuitive explanation would be that under incomplete enforcement
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the regulator wants to pay closer attention to the amount of control (i.e., emissions reduction) than
to the cost of control ceteris paribus; a task in which a quantity instrument is more effective.
Finally, note that if marginal cost and marginal benefit curves are positively correlated, that
is E[θη] > 0, an additional negative term enters into (35), which increases the advantage of
quantities over prices increases; otherwise benefit uncertainty does not intervene.23
6. Extensions
Results so far are based on a very specific enforcement policy. It is natural to think they may
change in the context of alternative enforcement policies. Here we extend the model to consider one
alternative enforcement policy and demonstrate, in particular, that our main result stated in
Proposition 4 does not change.
The new enforcement policy still retains the elements of self-reporting and enforcement
power from Livernois and Mackenna (1999). Instead of forcing a noncompliant firm to follow its
compliance report in order to come under compliance, in  this new enforcement policy, the regulator
lets a noncompliant firm found to be in violation to choose any strategy to return to compliance.
Consider, for example, the case of a firm with c > τ found to be in violation under a tax regulation
(prices). For this firm, the cheapest strategy to come under compliance would be to pay taxes
instead of reducing one unit of pollution. A similar situation occurs under a tradeable quota regime
(quantities). A firm with c > p found to be in violation would always prefer to buy quotas instead of
reducing pollution as a way to come under compliance.
Under this enforcement policy the cut-off points for a truthful compliance report are
~ / ( )c F= −φ φ1  and $c c= . For an interior solution we assume, as before, that τ (and p) >
~ / ( )c F= −φ φ1 ; otherwise there will be full compliance. Under this new enforcement policy, the
submission of false reports increases because the expected penalty for high cost firms has
decreased. Thus, we have
                                                
23
 See Stavins (1996) for a complete discussion on correlated uncertainty.
24
q
F c
Ce
( ) ( )τ τ φ= + −
′′
(36a)
q x
p F c
Ce
( ) ( )= + −
′′
φ (36b)
where p = p(x) can be obtained from the following market clearing condition (assuming rational
expectations)
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where the first term corresponds to sales from compliant firms, the second term corresponds to sales
from before-inspection noncompliant firms, and the term of the right hand side corresponds to
purchases from noncompliant firms found to be in violation that go to the market to buy quotas to
return to compliance. A uniform distribution of g(c) (i.e., linear aggregate marginal costs) yields24
p x c
C
x( ) = − ′′φ (38)
and under uncertainty
p x c
C
x( , )η φ η= −
′′
+ (39)
                                                
24
 The general form would be p x G x( ) ( / )= −−1 1 φ .
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It is important to mention that this new enforcement policy differs from the previous one in some
important ways. While Lemmas 1 and 2 still hold, Lemma 3 does no longer apply because
$( *) $( *)c c x cτ = = , Lemma 4 shifts in favor of prices, and Lemmas 5 and 6 are reverted (i.e., τ** >
τ* and x** < x*). The latter means that under incomplete enforcement, it is second-best optimal to
set less stringent regulatory levels.
Finally, to see whether the main result of this paper—Proposition 4—continues to hold
under this new enforcement policy (the proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are left to the reader), we
estimate ∆pq by substituting the above expressions into the appropriate expected welfare function
(see eq. (32)) and using, as before, the fact that
ητη += **)*,*(xp (40)
the difference in expected welfare reduces to
])1([)(2 2
2
pq BBCC
′′
−+′′+′′
′′
=∆ φφση (41)
which is the same expression we obtained for the previous enforcement policy (see eq. (35)). And
as before, the reason is that under a quantity regime with incomplete enforcement, the amount of
control does not remain fixed, but it rather adapts somewhat to unexpected cost shocks, which
ultimately reduces the advantage of prices over quotas.
It would be useful to extend the analysis to other enforcement policies. A common approach
used in earlier papers (e.g., Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 1977; and  Malik, 1990) is to simply consider a
fine F and no enforcement power. Although we cannot test such an approach here because the
assumption of constant individual marginal costs would not yield interior solutions, there are no
reasons to think that the results stated in Propositions 1-3 will no longer hold. Proposition 4 may be
harder to prove unless one accepts that firms would respond to unexpected shocks in their control
costs by changing their compliance strategies as they did in the two cases studied here.
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6. Conclusions
There is no doubt that imperfect monitoring and incomplete enforcement are central in
understanding regulatory performance in practice, and therefore, it is very relevant to ask whether
they have any policy implications in the choice of regulatory instruments. In this paper, I extended
Weitzman’s (1974) “Prices vs. Quantities” to allow for incomplete enforcement. I found that
whether the regulator uses prices (e.g. taxes) or quantities (e.g. tradeable quotas), a first-best design
is inefficient in the presence of incomplete enforcement. A second-best design that incorporates
incomplete enforcement and where cost and benefit curves are known with certainty, can be
implemented equally with either instrument. If benefit and cost curves are uncertain, however, a
quantity instrument performs better. In fact, if the slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves are equal, quantities are always preferred over prices.
 The rationale for the latter result is that with incomplete enforcement the effective (or
observed) amount of control under a quantity instrument is not longer fixed. Instead, it adapts to the
possible shocks affecting the marginal cost curve. Indeed, if the marginal costs curve turns out to be
higher than expected, some firms would choose not to comply with the regulation, and
consequently, the effective amount and cost of control would be lower. Because a quantity
instrument would now have this “flexibility” for the cost of control to adapt to unexpected shocks,
the advantage of prices over quantities is necessarily reduced. Put differently, the marginal cost
curve becomes relatively flatter under incomplete enforcement. A more intuitive explanation would
be that under incomplete enforcement the regulator wants to pay closer attention to the amount of
control (i.e., emissions reduction) than to the cost of control ceteris paribus; a task in which a
quantity instrument is more effective.
A natural extension of the work presented here would be to include these results into a more
general theory of regulatory instrument choice. I am sure that such a theoretical exercise would
have to rely heavily on numerical simulations.
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Figure 1. Compliance with prices (taxes)
